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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Rise in Governmental Interest to Cure Abuses in the
Securities Industry
Since the Great Depression of 1929, the Federal Government has
shown a stark retreat from a laissez-faire philosophy in which it left
regulation of the stock markets substantially up to market forces. Con-
gress believed that the Great Depression was a direct result of irrespon-
sible behavior of the stock exchanges and, accordingly, has taken a
much more active role in the regulation of the markets.' Although
1. Congress' belief that much more aggressive regulation was needed is most apparent in the
following remarks by Senator King which prefaced the extensive debates that accompanied the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
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securities regulation has been prevalent throughout the majority of this
century, the prosecution of insider trading' has been a recent phenome-
non finding its roots in caselaw dating only three decades old.3
Although young, this doctrine has blossomed into one of the most sig-
nificant areas of securities regulation.'
The rising interest in insider trading in the 1990s is not at all sur-
prising when one considers the fact that the late 90s have seen a boom in
the Mergers and Acquisitions ("M&A") field. The year of 1997 saw a
proliferation of M&A activity that spanned all industries.5 Whatever
effect this phenomenon has on the health of national and international
economies, one effect is certain-the rise in M&A activity is a very
Mr. President, several years ago, and upon one or two occasions since, I introduced
measures, which were referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency, and
which, in my opinion, if they had been enacted into law, would have prevented the
debacle of 1929 so far as the stock exchange, stock sales, and so forth, are
concerned. Unfortunately, no action was taken with respect to those measures. I
am now introducing a bill to establish a Federal stock exchange and securities
commission, to regulate transactions in securities on the various stock exchanges,
and for other purposes.
78 CONG. REC. 1991 (1934) (remarks by Senator King upon introduction of S. 2642), reprinted in
1 FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITrEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 634 (1983).
2. Insider trading is most commonly found to be a violation of §10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("§10(b)"), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), and SEC Rule lOb-5 ("Rule lOb-
5"), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997), promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 10(b) states, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ......
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Similarly, Rule lOb-5 states, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]...
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (November 8,
1961).
4. The burgeoning of liability premised upon § 10(b) has been metaphorically described as
"a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." United States v.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622 (8th Cir. 1996).
5. One theory for the increase in M&A activity is that firms are acquiring other firms in
order to acquire a talented labor force during a booming economy that has resulted in a scarcity of
talented labor due to high employment rates. See Bernard Wysocki Jr., Many Mergers Driven By
Search For Fresh Talent, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1997, at 67C.
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tempting enticement to insiders who may attempt to use nonpublic infor-
mation regarding a planned tender offer by purchasing stock or options
in a target firm and then cashing in to reap substantial profits.6
B. Misappropriation vs. Classical Theory
The Supreme Court decided United States v. O'Hagan7 in the mid-
dle of 1997 during a maelstrom of ideologies concerning insider trading.
These doctrinal differences still exist today and are housed in two
schools of thought: the "classical theory" of insider trading and the
"misappropriation theory" of insider trading. Under the "classical
theory:"
§ 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in
the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information. Trading on such information qualifies as a "deceptive
device" under § 10(b) .. .because "a relationship of trust and confi-
dence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of
their position with that corporation." [This] relationship . . . "gives
rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading] because of the
necessity of preventing a corporate insider from ... tak[ing] unfair
advantage of ... uninformed ... stockholders." 8
The "misappropriation theory," on the other hand,
[H]olds that a person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities
transaction, and thereby violates §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading pur-
poses, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.
Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a
duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the
exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a
fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or
seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information.9
Thus, the classical theory emphasizes the relationship between the par-
ties to the transaction, whereas the misappropriation theory emphasizes
the relationship between the trader and the source of the information. At
the time O'Hagan was under consideration, the misappropriation theory
6. When a tender offer is announced, usually the price of the target company rises and the
price of the offeror falls or remains the same. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 628 n.3 (7th Cir.
1995).
7. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
8. Id. at 2207 (citations omitted).
9. Id. (citations omitted).
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had been officially endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second1", Seventh'", and Ninth 12 Circuits and had been rejected by
the Fourth13 and Eighth Circuits14 .
C. Background of United States v. O'Hagan
James Herman O'Hagan ("O'Hagan") was a partner in the law firm
of Dorsey and Whitney in Minneapolis. 5 Grand Metropolitan PLC
("Grand Met") retained the firm to represent Grand Met regarding a
potential tender offer' 6 for the stock of Pillsbury Company ("Pills-
bury"). 7 The firms underwent measures to protect the confidentiality of
these plans. 8 O'Hagan did not perform any work associated with the
tender offer; however, he acquired confidential information about the
deal through deceptions of a fellow partner at Dorsey and Whitney who
was working on the deal.19 During Dorsey and Whitney's representation
of Grand Met, O'Hagan purchased a substantial amount of call options2"
as well as shares of common stock in Pillsbury.2' When Grand Met
announced its tender offer, the price of Pillsbury stock nearly doubled
and O'Hagan reaped profits totaling more than $4.3 million.22
A subsequent Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") inves-
tigation led to a 57-count indictment that alleged that O'Hagan
defrauded his law firm and its client, Grand Met, by using material, non-
public information regarding Grand Met's planned tender offer for his
own trading purposes.23 Among the 57 counts listed in the indictment
were 17 counts of securities fraud, in violation of §10(b) and SEC Rule
10. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
11. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
12. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
13. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
14. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
15. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
16. A tender offer is an attempt by a bidder to acquire control of a public company (the
"target") through the acquisition of some or all of the target's outstanding shares through a bid
made directly to the target's shareholders who will "tender" their shares in return for cash at a
price which is above the current market price. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., BUSINESS PLANNING
FOR MERGERS AND AcQuIsrrIONS 13 (1977).
17. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
18. See id.
19. See Petitioner's Brief 1997 WL 86306 at *4, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997) (No. 96-842).
20. A call option gives the holder the right to purchase a specified number of shares of stock
by a certain date at a specific price. If the shares are not purchased by that date, the option expires
and along with it the right to purchase the specified number of shares. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at
614 n.1.
21. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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lOb-5, as well as §14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 14e-3(a),24 promulgated thereunder.25 A jury convicted
O'Hagan on all counts, and he was sentenced to a 41-month term of
imprisonment.26
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed all
of O'Hagan's convictions.27 The Eighth Circuit rejected the validity of
the misappropriation theory28 (which was used to prosecute O'Hagan
who did not have a fiduciary duty with the seller of the securities, i.e.
Pillsbury's stockholders, but did have a fiduciary duty with the source of
the confidential information, Dorsey and Whitney and Grand Met, Dor-
sey and Whitney's client).2 9 The Eighth Circuit premised its rejection of
the misappropriation theory on the grounds that it failed to take into
account two elements necessary to maintain a prosecution under § 10(b):
24. As will be elaborated upon in this paper, prosecutions under §14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("§14e"), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988), frequently accompany §10(b)
violations. Section 14(e) proscribes fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer.
Specifically, §14(e) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
The [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.
The SEC invoked Congress' grant of rulemaking authority and promulgated Rule 14e-3(a), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1998) which states, in pertinent part:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has commenced,
a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the [Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] for any other person who is in possession of material infor-
mation relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to
know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired
directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf
of the offering person or such issuer,
to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any
securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or
right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a rea-
sonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its source are pub-
licly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
25. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 2206.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 2208 n.5 and n.6.
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1) a misrepresentation or nondisclosure which is 2) in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. 3° Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the counts based on Rule 14e-3(a) under the belief that the SEC
had exceeded its rule-making authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a).31
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit on both of these
holdings.32
D. Outline of Comment
This comment will analyze, in three parts, the evolution of insider
trading jurisprudence and the investor protections and remedies that
have resulted from this jurisprudence. Part II of the comment will out-
line the judicial interpretations of § 10(b) and culminate in an analysis of
the Court's opinion in O'Hagan. Part III will trace the legislative his-
tory of § 10(b) and § 14(e) with a particular focus on the structural frame-
work and the underlying purposes upon which the two provisions were
enacted (something courts have been hesitant to do). Finally, Part IV
will attempt to form a synthesis of Parts II and III and analyze whether
the Supreme Court's articulation of insider trading jurisprudence in
O'Hagan provides adequate protection for investors or whether it pro-
vides redundant remedies. Ultimately, this paper will conclude that,
assuming O'Hagan is correct in its holding that the SEC did not exceed
its rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a), the misappropri-
ation theory is merely a redundancy that can be ignored since misappro-
priation cases may come under the authority of § 14(e) or possibly under
a tipper/tippee analysis of the classical theory. This conclusion is due to
the fact that the misappropriation theory is largely a response to the
unique problems encountered while prosecuting insider trading cases in
the M&A context.
30. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (The court stated, "[wie reject the
misappropriation theory, in part, because it permits the imposition of §10(b) liability based upon
the mere breach of fiduciary duty without a particularized showing of misrepresentation or
nondisclosure... We need not tarry long on this point, however, because... [the theory] permits
liability for a breach of duty owed to individuals who are unconnected to and perhaps uninterested
in a securities transaction, thus rendering meaningless the 'in connection with. . . statutory
language").
31. Prosecutions under § 10(b), whether under the classical or misappropriation theory,
require the existence of some fiduciary relationship. The Eighth Circuit held that since Rule 14e-
3(a) did not require this fiduciary element and, in fact, provided its own definition of fraud, the
SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority in §14(e). See id. at 624.
32. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INSIDER TRADING JURISPRUDENCE
A. §16(b)
Interestingly enough, §16(b)33, as opposed to §10(b), was the first
piece of legislation courts invoked to prosecute those engaged in insider
trading.34 In fact, §16(b) is the only provision in the entire Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 which explicitly states that its purpose is to
address insider trading concerns. The provision explicitly states that:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized . . .
within any period of less than six months ... shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of
such beneficial owner, director, or officer.
Thus, §16(b) provided a somewhat strong but short term incentive for
insiders not to abuse their fiduciary status for profit by allowing a dis-
gorgement of any profits they may obtain through the activity (albeit
only if the transactions took place within a six-month time frame).
In Adler v. Klawans,36 the Second Circuit gave not only an inter-
pretation of § 16(b) but also an enlightening look at the overall structure
of the securities laws as they applied to insider trading. The issue in
Adler was whether a director had to relinquish profits made on sales of a
corporation's stock that were sold while he was holding his office but
purchased before he took the office. In holding that the profits were
covered under §16(b), the court made the following statements about
insider trading:
The undoubted congressional intent in the enactment of § 16(b) was to
discourage what was reasonably thought to be a widespread abuse of
a fiduciary relationship-specifically to discourage if not prevent
three classes of persons from making private and gainful use of infor-
mation acquired by them by virtue of their official relationship to a
corporation. The objective was not to punish but to deter the persons
in these three categories-directors, officers, 10% beneficial own-
ers-from making improper use of information gained in a represen-
tative capacity. The practices could not be prevented in toto but
Congress sought to take the profit out of what it considered improper
conduct.37
Thus, the Second Circuit in Adler believed that Congress had provided a
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
34. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
36. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
37. Id. at 844.
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relatively weak remedy for insider trading. Furthermore, the court stated
that:
Large areas of 'insider' conduct were consciously left untouched by
Congress for reasons dictated by practicalities rather than ethics or
pure logic. A line had to be drawn somewhere by the lawmakers, as
they must do in the laws of marriage, divorce, legitimacy, real estate,
wills and a host of other subjects governed by statute.38
One can see that the Second Circuit believed insider trading to be
only lightly touched by the securities laws. It is ironic that this same
Circuit would eventually become the most zealous advocate for an
expansionary reading of §10(b).
B. Cady, Roberts & Co. 's Introduction of §1O(b) as a Remedy
Against Insider Trading
Section 16(b) proved too light a remedy to combat the evils of
insider trading, and the SEC responded to the need for a more powerful
remedy in the administrative case of Cady, Roberts & Co.39 In this case,
the SEC, for the first time, articulated §10(b) and Rule lOb-5's interpre-
tation as a prohibition against insider trading. The SEC had to deter-
mine the duties of a broker after receiving non-public information about
a company's dividend action from a director who was employed by the
same brokerage firm.4° Chairman Cary determined that the broker
(whose actions were considered those of the firm) had to disclose mate-
rial facts which were known to him by virtue of his position but which
were not known to persons with whom he dealt.4" Chairman Cary went
further to state that if disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale
would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, then the alter-
native is to forgo the transaction.4" From this, we get the often-cited,
Cady, Roberts "disclose or abstain" rule.
In ruling as it did, the Commission rejected Adler's narrow inter-
pretation of the Exchange Act stating, "[t]hese anti-fraud provisions are
not intended as a specification of particular acts or practices which con-
stitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and
others."43 Upon a cursory analysis, it would appear that the SEC
endorsed the misappropriation theory even in the early days of insider
38. Id. at 845.
39. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (November 8,
1961).
40. See id. at 907.
41. See id. at 912.
42. See id. at 911.
43. Id.
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trading enforcement." However, this analysis fails given Chairman
Cary's statements in Cady, Roberts that, "our task.., is to identify those
persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its
internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its
securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be
exploited."45 Thus, the Commission seemed to be content at this point
to enforce only the classical theory.
In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,46 the Supreme
Court stated that its interpretation of the securities laws led it to believe
that the provisions should be read "flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial
purpose[s]" and not "technically and restrictively. ' 47 The Court here
dealt with provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940;48 how-
ever, it was explicit that it's theory applied to all of the securities laws.
The Second Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's more expansive
view of insider trading liability in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch 49 by recog-
nizing that tippees (recipients of confidential, non-public information)
are just as liable as the insider for insider trading. 50 However, in dis-
cussing the liability of these tippees, the court stated that "the essential
purpose of Rule lOb-5 is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees
from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed outsiders."'51 Thus, the
Second Circuit appears to have been thinking expansively with regards
to only the classical theory.
C. Restrictions on the Scope of Rule lOb-5
The Supreme Court seemed intent on expanding the reach of § 10(b)
as an antifraud provision as evidenced in Capital Gains; however, the
Court also restricted §10(b)'s reach in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores52 and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.53 In Blue Chip Stamps,
the Court examined the "in connection with the purchase or sale"
requirement and concluded that in a private damage action under § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff class was limited to the actual purchasers
and sellers of securities.54 Thus, the Court made official note of the "in
44. Of course, this would not be an unexpected event, as one would be surprised to see an
administrative agency give a restrictive reading to the statutes upon which it bases its authority.
45. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912.
46. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
47. See id. at 195.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq.
49. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
50. See id. at 236.
51. Id. at 235.
52. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
53. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
54. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-32.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
connection with" element and recognized a needed relationship between
the actual purchasers and sellers of the securities in question and the
insider trader. This would appear to strengthen the case for the classical
theory.
Similarly, the Court in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. emphasized that
Rule lOb-5 could not exceed its authority as derived from §10(b). In
Sante Fe, the Court refused to find a §10(b) violation where minority
shareholders claimed that a corporation's parent company was not valu-
ing their stock appropriately when exercising its right under a Delaware
"short-form merger" statute to merge with its subsidiary so long as the
corporation bought back the minority shareholders' shares .5  The Court
recognized that §10(b) required some form of deception which was not
apparent and stated that a mere breach of fiduciary duty without any
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, did not violate § 10(b). 51
Of particular interest to the Court was the existence of other avenues to
gain relief such as through the Delaware Courts of Chancery.57 The
Court articulated its point stating that the "fundamental purpose of the
Act [is] implementing a philosophy of full disclosure; once full and fair
disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transactions is at
most a tangential concern of the statute."58 Thus, the Court reaffirmed
the doctrine that § 10(b) was not intended to remedy all breaches of con-
duct and had to be confined to the subset of breaches for which it was
intended.
D. The Tender Offer Cases and the Introduction of the
Misappropriation Theory
Santa Fe Industries foreshadowed the litigation of the next two
decades that led up to O'Hagan-a frenzy of cases set in the M&A
context. As stated earlier, M&A deals can offer large temptations to an
insider due to the effect the deals have on the stock price of the target
firm. The inherent difficulty in prosecuting M&A insider trading cases,
however, stems from the structure of the particular deal. Since there are
at least two participating firms, the potential for "insiders" can come
from two sources, either the target firm or the acquiring firm. Therefore,
there will be a good chance that an individual who wishes to capitalize
off of inside information does not have a fiduciary relationship with the
firm whose stock he/she is trading (almost always the target firm).
55. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. at 466.
56. See id. at 475-76.
57. See id. at 467.
58. Id. at 478.
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Because classical insider trading doctrine could not apply to these scena-
rios, the courts (and Congress) responded to this dilemma.
The Supreme Court initially addressed this concern in Chiarella v.
United States.59 Chiarella was a financial printer whose employer had
been engaged by certain corporations to print corporate takeover bids.60
In accordance with the large degree of secrecy and confidentiality
required in performing these deals, the corporations made it a practice
not to include the identities of the acquiring or target firms. 61 These
areas were replaced by blank spaces or false names, and the true names
were sent to the printer on the night of the final printing.62 Chiarella,
however, was able to deduce the identities of the parties and, accord-
ingly, made trades on the stocks of the target firms and reaped substan-
tial profits.63 The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction on the
grounds that Chiarella had no duty to disclose his trades since he did not
have a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the target firm for
which he traded.64 The Court repeated its sentiments from Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. stating that "not every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)."65 The Court further stated
that "neither the Congress nor the Commission ever adopted a parity-of-
information rule."' 66 Thus, the Court in Chiarella maintained the posi-
tion of earlier cases that §10(b) was not meant to function as a cure-all
for all financial woes and that other remedies, if available, should be
sought.6 7
In spite of the Supreme Court's reluctance to rule on the validity of
the misappropriation theory in Chiarella, the Second Circuit quickly
endorsed it in United States v. Newman.68 Newman was a securities
trader who received misappropriated confidential information from
investment bankers who had been entrusted with the information by cor-
porate clients concerning proposed mergers and acquisitions.69 The
59. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
60. See id. at 224.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 231. Of course, the Supreme Court's holding in O'Hagan changes the doctrine
in that now a fiduciary relationship with the source will maintain a prosecution under §10(b) as
well. Query: Would this change the holding in Chiarella given that there was not a relationship
of confidence and trust considering the fact that the firms hid the identities of the participating
firms until the time of final printing?
65. Id. at 232.
66. Id. at 233.
67. The Court actually did consider the misappropriation theory but failed to rule on its
validity as it had not been presented to the jury at the trial level. See id. at 236.
68. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
69. See id. at 15.
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court reasoned that a deception had occurred in that the trading sullied
the reputations of the investment banks as safe repositories of client con-
fidences.7" Furthermore, the court explicitly noted that the misappropri-
ation theory was being offered by the government "to remedy the
deficiency [found] in Chiarella."71 Thus, the Second Circuit recognized
the inherent difficulty of prosecuting insider trading in the M&A per-
spective using the classical theory and instead appllied the misappropria-
tion theory as an avenue around the dilemma.72
The Supreme Court placed an obstacle to the rising acceptance of
the misappropriation theory in Dirks v. SEC.7 3 The Court stated, "[W]e
reaffirm today that a duty to disclose arises from the relationship
between parties and not merely from one's ability to acquire information
because of his position in the market."74 The Court expressed concern
that imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider (as
Dirks had done) and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on
the role of market analysis.75 Furthermore, although Dirks was not a
misappropriation case but a case involving the tipper/tippee doctrine of
the classical theory, the Court seemed to respond to the concerns of the
circuits that believed that the misappropriation theory was the only via-
ble avenue to remedy M&A insider trading cases. Specifically, the
Court stated:
We do not suggest that knowingly trading on inside information is
ever "socially desirable or even that it is devoid of moral considera-
tions" . . . Nor do we imply an absence of responsibility to disclose
promptly indications of illegal actions by a corporation to the proper
authorities in cases involving securities .... But in a statutory area of
the law such as securities regulation, where legal principles of gen-
eral application must be applied, there may be "significant distinc-
tions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideas."'76
Therefore, according to the Dirks Court, the possible reprehensible
nature of the insider trading does not give a court carte blanche authority
to read a statute in whatever manner will most conveniently ensure a
conviction.
70. See id. at 17.
71. See id. at 15.
72. For other cases in which courts have turned to the misappropriation theory as an avenue
for dealing with the unique situations that arise in the M&A context, see, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51
F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
74. Id. at 657-58.
75. See id. at 658.
76. Id. at 661 n.21 (citations omitted).
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E. Subsequent Expansions of the Misappropriation Theory
Despite the Supreme Court's statements in Dirks, courts continued
to pursue the misappropriation doctrine as a means to prosecute insider
trading; in fact, new and more novel uses of the misappropriation theory
evolved. In United States v. Reed77 , the Southern District of New York
refused to dismiss an indictment of a trader who traded shares of stock
of a corporation based upon non-public confidential information about
an upcoming merger the company was engaged in.78 The interesting
aspect of this case was that the trader acquired the information through
conversations with his father, a member of the board of directors of the
firm with whose stock the trader dealt.79 Since the indictment did not
allege that the father provided the information for the improper purpose
of exploiting the information for personal gain, the classical theory
would not have provided a basis for liability.8" Instead, the United
States Attorney proceeded on a misappropriation theory, arguing that the
son had a fiduciary relationship with his father which he breached by
using the information conveyed to him without disclosing the trading
activities to his father.8" The court engaged in an exhaustive analysis of
what constitutes a fiduciary relationship and, ultimately, left it to the
trier of fact to determine.8" Reed is an excellent example of the slippery
slope that courts have gone down in attempting to use the misappropria-
tion theory to prevent the doctrinal holes that M&A deals afford to
insiders.
A more expansive interpretation of the misappropriation theory can
be found in United States v. Carpenter.83 In Carpenter, a reporter/writer
for the Wall Street Journal used and passed on to his co-conspirators
non-public information, which he obtained in his professional capacity,
to speculate in the stock market.84 Notwithstanding these unique facts,
the Second Circuit held that a violation of §10(b) had occurred. The
court reasoned that the reporter had breached the fiduciary duty that he
held with the Wall Street Journal.86 Furthermore, the court held that the
"in connection with" requirement was satisfied by the writer' s use of the
misappropriated information for his financial benefit which caused a
77. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
78. See id. at 737.
79. See id. at 690.
80. See id. at 693-94 n.15.
81. See id. at 695.
82. See id. at 712-17.
83. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
84. See id. at 1026.
85. See id. at 1036.
86. See id. at 1032.
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financial detriment to those investors with whom he traded.87 The court
concluded its analysis with a policy statement, namely that "[to] hold
otherwise would undermine Congress' ideal in 1934 of an open and hon-
est market in which superior knowledge in the securities markets would
be achieved honestly, fairly, and without resort to pernicious conduct."88
Carpenter is probably the farthest reaching of the misappropriation
cases. Unlike the previous cases, it does not take place in the M&A
context. Even more startling, however, is the fact that it assigns liability
to a trader for conduct which would not violate § 10(b) had it been done
by the trader's employer. The Wall Street Journal could have traded
based on the information it had gathered, and it would not have been
liable for insider trading since it did not have a fiduciary duty to the
firms it reported on.89 Yet, the reporter was liable for the conduct solely
due to his status as a fiduciary of the newspaper. Such inequitable appli-
cation of the law does not occur in the M&A context.
This principle can be illustrated using the facts of O'Hagan. James
O'Hagan was found liable for insider trading due to his status as a fidu-
ciary with Dorsey and Whitney (the source of his information). 90 Fur-
thermore, had Dorsey and Whitney committed the same acts as
O'Hagan, it also would have been liable due to its status as a fiduciary
of Grand Met via the attorney-client relationship. To take the analysis
one step further, if management or members of the board of Grand Met
had decided to trade based on the information, they too would have been
liable since they had a fiduciary duty to Grand Met (or, more accurately,
to the shareholders of Grand Met), the source of their information.
Thus, liability is distributed regardless of the status of the parties. 91 It is
for this reason that if the misappropriation theory is to be used at all, it
should be confined to the M&A context.
F. Misappropriation Theory Dissenters
Despite the Second Circuit's vigorous attempts to promote the mis-
appropriation theory, some circuits dissented, particularly the Fourth and
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1036.
89. Of course, practically speaking the Wall Street Journal would probably not engage in this
behavior since to do so would alert the business community; and the Journal would, more than
likely, quickly find information gathering to be a difficult endeavor. This does not change the
legal implications of the inequitable application of the law to the parties.
90. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2220 (1977).
91. See Carpenter, 794 F.2d at 1033. This anomaly was pointed out to the court. Apparently
the court believed that the business practicalities of running a major newspaper (i.e. protection of
reputation, etc.) was sufficient to outweigh the concern. This concern for business practicalities
does not, however, give a justification for the inequitable application of the law.
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Eighth Circuits in United States v. Bryan9" and United States v.
O'Hagan9 3 respectively. Both circuits believed that the courts that rec-
ognized the misappropriation theory validated the theory on the basis of
the assumed unfairness of allowing an individual to trade securities on
the basis of information that is not available to other traders.94 The cir-
cuits could not allow this policy reason to overrule what was, in their
opinion, the correct interpretation of the law. In fact, the Eighth Circuit,
in O'Hagan, expressed its concern as to how the Second Circuit decided
Newman without quoting or discussing the language of §10(b), without
citing to Santa Fe with its language regarding not unduly expanding the
securities laws, and without significantly analyzing Chiarella.95 Specifi-
cally, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits rejected the misappropriation the-
ory because it permitted the imposition of §10(b) liability without a
showing of misrepresentation or nondisclosure, only the misappropria-
tion of information.96 Furthermore, these circuits appeared particularly
disturbed by the belief that the misappropriation theory did not call for
the violation to be "in connection with the purchase or sale of a scur-
ity," since it merely called for the breach of a duty owed to individuals
who "are unconnected to and perhaps uninterested in a securities
transaction."97
G. O'Hagan's Attempts at Resolution
The Supreme Court finally resolves the conflict among the circuits
in United States v. O'Hagan.98 The Court follows the example set by
the Second Circuit and, in upholding the validity of the misappropriation
theory, largely uses a pragmatic rationale stressing the importance of
eliminating insider trading due to the unfair advantages it affords privi-
leged parties.99
With regards to the question of whether the misappropriation the-
ory included the requisite deception element, the Court concludes that
this element is included due to the fact that "misappropriators ... deal in
92. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
93. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
94. See id. at 621.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 618.
97. See id.
98. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
99. Id. at 2207-08. ("The misappropriation theory is ... designed to protect the integrity of
the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation who have access to
confidential information that will affect the corporation's security price when revealed, but who
owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders").
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deception."''° To illustrate this principle, the Court draws an analogy
between the fraudulent misappropriation of information and embezzle-
ment, the fraudulent misappropriation of money; it concludes that both
involve deception. "
Furthermore, the Court states that the "in connection with" require-
ment of §10(b) is satisfied "because the fiduciary's fraud is consum-
mated not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but
when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to
purchase or sell securities." 10 2 The Court, thus, engages in a hindsight
analysis by imputing knowledge that the misappropriated information
will be used in connection with the purchase or sale of securities to the
time when the information is misappropriated. The Court supports its
theory by engaging in several assumptions about events that could sur-
round the misappropriator's actions. °3 For example, when confronted
with the prospect that O'Hagan could have profited from the information
by selling the information to Pillsbury or using it to entice Pillsbury to
use him for legal work, the Court discounts the idea stating that a firm
would have large doubts about engaging a lawyer who readily betrayed
a client's confidence.1 4 Also, when the Court is confronted with the
notion that a misappropriator may disclose his trades to his source of
information and may then escape §10(b) liability while continuing to
trade and harm investors, the Court suggests that the source may seek
appropriate equitable relief under state law. 0 5
The Court handles the insider trading precedent in various ways.
First, it distinguishes Santa Fe by confining it to its facts and pointing
out that all the pertinent facts in that case were disclosed by the person
charged with violating §10(b) and, therefore, there was no deception. 0 6
It then reduces the precedential value of Chiarella by pointing out that
the case left open the question of the validity of the misappropriation
theory since that theory had not been presented to the jury and was, thus,
not analyzed.'0 7 Finally, the Court discounts Dirks by explaining that
Dirks was not found liable because the insiders in that case had acted not
for personal profit, but to expose a massive fraud within the
corporation. 08
100. Id. at 2208. ("[the misappropriator] pretends loyalty to the principal while secretly
converting the principal's information for personal gain").
101. See id. at 2209.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 2210 n.8.
105. See id. at 2209.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 2212.
108. See id. at 2213.
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The Court then addresses the issue of whether Rule 14e-3(a) repre-
sented action on the part of the SEC which exceeded its rulemaking
authority. The Court concludes that it did not need to resolve whether
the SEC's authority under §14(e) to define such acts and practices as
fraudulent is broader than it's fraud-defining authority under §10(b). It
reasons that Rule 14e-3(a) as it applied to cases similar to O'Hagan
qualified "under §14(e) as a 'means reasonably designed to prevent'
fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the tender offer
context."' 9 The Court, thus, holds that under §14(e), the SEC could
prohibit acts, not themselves fraudulent under the common law or
§ 10(b) if the prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent acts and prac-
tices that are fraudulent." 0 This holding means that prosecutions under
§14(e) do not require the existence of a fiduciary duty as required in
§10(b) prosecutions. Thus, there is a less rigorous requirement, assum-
ing the insider's transactions are being conducted within a tender offer
context.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING
In their attempts to use the legislative history to discern an under-
standing of § 10(b), courts have been frustrated with the fact that there is
a scarce amount of information regarding the provision."'' What many
of these courts fail to do, however, is to look at the general scope of the
entire Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and how the various provisions
work together. By engaging in this form of analysis, one sees a clearer
picture of what Congress intended pertaining to insider trading.
A. Ultimate Goals of Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The ultimate goals of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are read-
ily apparent when one looks at the Senate and House Reports, as well as
communications from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, regarding the
bill. In the President's opinion, the legislation was intended to accom-
plish two goals, one substantive and one procedural." 2 The substantive
109. See id. at 2217. There is a strong argument, therefore, that the question of whether the
SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3(a) is still an open one to be
resolved at a later date. For purposes of analyzing 14e-3(a) as it relates to lOb-5, however, it is
assumed that the SEC did not exceed its rulemaking abilities.
110. See id.
111. See United States v. Carpenter, 796 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting paucity of
legislative history on § 10(b)).
112. The letter reads, in pertinent part:
The people of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully aware of the fact
that unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities was one of the most
important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted "boom" which had
so much to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929 ... The two
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goal was to halt excessive margin transactions 1 3 that the President
believed was a major cause of the economic disaster of the Great
Depression. t1 4 The procedural goal was to grant authority to the federal
government to oversee the stock exchanges so that it could ensure
another economic crash did not occur. 1 5  It follows that President
Roosevelt's primary focus was on restricting the use of margin accounts
in the stock market.
Congress agreed with the President in the halting of excessive mar-
gin transactions but expanded upon the goals of the Exchange Act. In
Congress' view, the Act had three objectives: 1) preventing the exces-
sive use of credit for speculation (this is the corollary to President
Roosevelt's margin transactions), 2) ending the unfair practices em-
ployed in speculation, and 3) minimizing the secrecy surrounding
the financial condition of corporations which invite the public to pur-
chase their securities."I6 Congress' concerns are addressed primarily in
principal objectives [of the legislation] are, as I see it-First, the requirement of
what is known as "margins" so high that speculation even as it exists today, will of
necessity be dramatically curtailed; and Second, that the Government be given such
definite powers of supervision over exchanges that the government itself will be
able to correct abuses which may arise in the future. We must, of course, prevent
insofar as possible manipulation of prices to the detriment of actual investors, but at
the same time we must eliminate unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation.
S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 2 (1934) (accompanying S. 3420), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIA-
TION SECURITIES LAW COMMrTTEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982,
at 709 (1983).
113. Margin transactions involve speculation in securities with borrowed money. See id. at 6.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 5. The House of Representatives expressed similar objectives. See H.R. Rep.
No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934) (accompanying H.R. 9323), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
SECURITIES LAW COMMrIrEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at
794 (1983). Congress, in fact, explicitly codified its objectives in §2 of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b. §2 provides:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with
a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and
control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto...
(1) Such transactions... involve the use of credit, directly affect the financing of
trade, industry, and transportation in interstate commerce, and directly affect and
influence the volume of interstate commerce and affect the national credit...
(3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are
susceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives
rise to excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in
the prices of securities which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion and
unreasonable contraction of the volume of credit available for trade, transportation,
and industry in interstate commerce, (b) hinder the proper appraisal of the value of
securities and thus prevent a fair calculation of taxes owing to the United States and
to the several States by owners, buyers, and sellers of securities, and (c) prevent the
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§ 7117 (Margin Requirements), § 9118 (Prohibition Against Manipulation
of Security Prices), § 12 and § 13119 (Registration Requirements for
Securities and Periodical and Other Reports) of the Exchange Act.
Understanding these objectives is crucial for an understanding of § 10(b)
because all other provisions of the Exchange Act revolve around them.
B. Insider Trading Provisions
Interestingly enough, members of Congress did have insider trading
in their minds when they drafted the Exchange Act; however, the legis-
lative history indicates that Congress meant to remedy it through the use
of §16120 which contains provisions requiring the reporting of any
change in the holdings of directors, officers, and principal shareholders
of a corporation.' 2 1 The Senate Report also makes mention of §16(b)
which, as discussed above, allows a corporation to recover any profits
made from the selling of stock by an insider within a six month
period. 122 Specifically, the Senate Report states:
The bill further aims to protect the interests of the public by prevent-
ing directors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corporation, the
stock of which is traded in on (sic) exchanges, from speculating in
the stock on the basis of information not available to others. Any
change in the holdings of such insiders must be reported to the Com-
mission, and profits realized from the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase of an equity security within a period of less than 6
months are recoverable by the corporation. Such a provision will
render difficult or impossible the kind of transactions which were fre-
quently described to the committee, where directors and large stock-
holders participated in pools trading in the stock of their own
companies, with the benefit of advance information regarding an
increase or resumption of dividends in some cases, and the passing of
dividends in others.' 23
In fact, the most glaring proof of Congress' intention to use § 16(b)
as the primary means for preventing insider trading is in a section of the
House Report entitled "Control of Unfair Practices by Corporate Insid-
ers" which states, in pertinent part:
Because it is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of law between
fair valuation of collateral for bank loans and/or obstruct the effective operation of
the national banking system and Federal Reserve System.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1988).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) (1988).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)-(m) (1988).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1988).
121. See S. Rep. No. 73-792 at 9 (1934).
122. See id.
123. Id.
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truly inside information and information generally known by the bet-
ter-informed investors, the most potent weapon against the abuse of
inside information is full and prompt publicity. For that reason, this
bill requires the disclosure of the corporate holdings of officers and
directors and stockholders owning more than 5 percent of any class
of stock, and prompt disclosure of any changes that occur in their
corporate holdings.' 24
Thus, Congress appears to have intended § 16 to regulate the problem of
insider trading.
This does not mean, however, that Congress did not envision a role
for § 10 in the scheme of insider trading. In fact, § 10 plays a very
important role in Congress' plan to attack insider trading, but this role is
in the form of §10(a)'s restrictions of short sales 25 and not necessarily
§10(b)'s catch-all provision. The House Report makes mention of
§ 10(a)'s restrictions against short selling as a preventive measure to stop
insider trading. 126 Furthermore, some of the most heated debates on the
floor of Congress concerned certain members' perceptions of short sell-
ing as a speculative evil that helped to bring about the Great Depres-
sion. 127 Thus, one of the central goals of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, elimination of excess speculation, is seen to be a part of § 10.
Finally, another indication of Congress' intent to use other provi-
sions to enforce insider trading is the fact that in the House version of
the bill, § 10 contained no subsection (b).1 28  Subsection (b) was not
added in until the House and Senate met in joint conference and the
124. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383 at 13 (1934).
125. A "short sale" "is a contract for sale of shares [of stock] which the seller does not own or
certificates for which are not within his control so as to be available for delivery at the time when,
under rules of the exchange, delivery must be made." Provost v. U.S., 269 U.S. 443, 450-51
(1926).
126. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383 at 13 (1934).
127. Congressman Sabath expressed the Congress' concern with short sales on the House floor
with a recitation of facts about the Stock Exchange including the fact that, "[n]ot one fourth of the
transactions on the exchange are sales where the seller actually parts with the security, and is paid
for it by the purchaser." 78 Cong. Rec. 7689 (1934) (remarks by Mr. Sabath regarding H.R.
9323), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITTEE, FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 823 (1983).
128. The original House version of the provision read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, to effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss
order in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in I FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES
LAW COMMi'rEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 755 (1983).
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House agreed to add the provision.12 9
C. Growth of §14
Section 10 has not been amended since its original enactment with
the rest of the Securities Exchange Act. In contrast, § 14 has undergone
two amendments that pertain to § 14(e). The original version of § 14 did
not possess a subsection (e). It merely regulated the use of proxies and
mandated that users of proxies had to obey rules promulgated by the
SEC. 130 Subsection (e) was added as a result of the Williams Act. 13 1
Congress believed that by adding an antifraud provision in the form of
subsection (e), it was affirming the fact that persons engaged in making
or opposing tender offers (or otherwise seeking to influence the decision
of investors or the outcome of the tender offer) are under an obligation
to make full disclosure of material information to those with whom they
deal. 132 Lastly, subsection (e), itself, was amended in 1970 to add a
provision which authorizes the SEC to define and prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
133
IV. SYNTHESIS
Ultimately, after observing the doctrinal evolution in the judicial
interpretation of insider trading jurisprudence coupled with the legisla-
tive history behind §10 and §14, one must conclude that 1) the misap-
propriation theory applies optimally to cases that come to courts from
the M&A context, and 2) §14(e) is more applicable to resolve M&A
cases than §10(b) is. These two observations lead us to the conclusion
that the misappropriation theory is not needed in lieu of § 14(e).
Regarding the misappropriation theory's optimal use in the M&A
context, as explained above, courts gave birth to the theory due to the
unique problems encountered in this arena. Whereas under the classical
theory, exploiters of inside information would escape judicial scrutiny as
a result of the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the trader and
129. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1838, at 23 (1934) (Conference Report), reprinted in I FEDERAL
BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITTEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1933-1982, at 1179 (1983).
130. See § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
131. 82 Stat. 454, Pub. Law 90-439 and 84 Stat. 1497, Pub. Law 91-567. The Williams Act
was enacted because Congress perceived special disclosure and protection problems which
consumers faced in a tender offer context. See S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 1 (1967), reprinted in I
FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITrEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 2107 (1983).
132. See S. Rep. No. 90-550, at 1 (1967).
133. See 84 Stat. 1497, Pub. Law 91-567.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the shareholders of the company upon which he is trading, the exploiter
is liable under the misappropriation theory since he has committed a
deception against the source of the nonpublic information. Courts may,
therefore, be correct in applying the misappropriation theory to M&A
cases.
They are not correct, however, in applying the same analysis to
cases which do not occur within the M&A paradigm. Proof of this the-
ory is evident by looking at the inequitable treatment that the law affords
in a Carpenter v. United States scenario. The SEC's zeal for preventing
insider trading should not be so rampant as to allow for a situation where
two parties will be afforded completely different treatment due solely to
their status in a transaction. 34 This is particularly true in a criminal
context where courts allot severe sanctions for violations of the law.
Thus, the misappropriation theory, if it is accepted at all (given the sub-
stantial amount of precedent mandating that § 10(b) not be unduly
expanded), must be applied solely to cases occurring within the M&A
paradigm.
However, if the above proposition is accepted, there exists a redun-
dancy of remedies in the law. Section 14(e), as stated above, provides a
far broader net of protection than § 10(b) which is restricted to cases
involving a fiduciary duty (whether it be to shareholders or the source of
information). Thus, when a case arises in the M&A context, § 14(e) will
be available to address the concern making the need for § 10(b) a nullity.
This theory is further bolstered by Congress' actions concerning
§10(b) and §14(e). If §10(b) was intended to address cases of this
nature, why did Congress feel it necessary to enact §14(e) thirty three
years later? Congress' refusal to amend §10(b) and its choice to make
subsequent amendments to §14 provide evidence of its intent to ulti-
mately use § 14(e) as the sole remedy for the illegal use of confidential
information in the M&A context. 135
It must be noted, however, that there may be a policy argument to
the effect that the misappropriation theory is necessary in M&A deals
that do not utilize a tender offer and, therefore, do not fall within the
purview of § 14(e)' 36 and would only be addressed by § 10(b). This
134. The typical argument is, of course, why should an individual such as Carpenter escape
liability even though he has committed acts of fraud? The counter to this argument, however, is
that the individual does not escape as he is still subject to certain State law remedies for breaches
of duty as well as to non-legal sanctions such as having his employment terminated.
135. The Court in O'Hagan recognized this in oral argument asking Counsel for the
Goverment whether 14(e) provided them with an easier argument for liability than 10(b). See
generally United States Supreme Court Transcript 1997 WL 182584, United States v. O'Hagan,
No. 96-842 (April 16, 1997).
136. Section 14(e) and all rules promulgated thereunder only apply to transactions involving
tender offers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
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argument fails though when one realizes that in the cases where this
analysis is required, lawsuits can be filed under a separate legal theory
or brought against other parties. A review of two cases, United States v.
Reed t37 and United States v. Chestman138 , will be illustrative.
As stated above, in Reed, a young man traded in the securities of a
firm for which his father served as director. 139 The son traded based
upon material, nonpublic information that the father provided to the son
regarding the merger of the firm with another company.140 The govern-
ment indicted the son based upon the misappropriation theory by reason-
ing that the son breached a fiduciary duty with his father via their family
relationship. 141
Although the government was very creative, it did not need to go
through the trouble of crafting such an elaborate argument to prosecute
the son. It could have merely proceeded to prosecute the son under the
classical theory of insider trading as the son was a "tippee" who
assumed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation not to
trade on material, nonpublic information which he obtained improperly
from an insider.1 42 The father's breach of duty to the shareholders
paved the way for a tipper/tippee analysis. The case is distinguishable
from that in Dirks in that the conveyance of information was not
intended to benefit the company. Furthermore, recourse could have
been sought against the father in that he breached his duty of care as a
director of the corporation by carelessly sharing confidential information
with his son. Accordingly, the father was subject to shareholder deriva-
tive suits. Again, a misappropriation analysis showed itself to be an
unnecessary redundancy.
Chestman further refutes arguments which favor the misappropria-
tion theory. In Chestman, an officer and shareholder of a potential target
corporation in a tender offer shared information about the offer with his
sister, who was also a shareholder in the firm. 4 3 The sister, in turn,
shared the information with her husband; he shared the information with
his stockbroker, Robert Chestman, who traded based upon it." Ironi-
cally, §14(e) applied because a tender offer was used. However, had the
transaction occurred in the context of a negotiated merger, no relief
137. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
138. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
139. See Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 689.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1982).
143. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555.
144. See id.
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would have been available under § 14(e) or under the classical theory
since the officer had not improperly disclosed the information.
It is even more ironic that in a case where the misappropriation
theory would have been truly useful, it failed. The Second Circuit held
the theory inapplicable as it reasoned that a sufficient fiduciary relation-
ship did not exist between the husband and his family. 145 Here, the
stockbroker would have escaped liability had it not been for the protec-
tions afforded by § 14(e).
However, even had the misappropriation theory applied in
Chestman, the case is illustrative of why the theory is not an effective
substitute. In many cases, the target firm will probably have enough
outside stockholders that any interested bidder would find a tender offer
to be the most useful tool to acquire a sizable amount of the target's
outstanding shares of stock. In a firm that has a lesser number of share-
holders or that possesses a capitalization structure in which the bulk of
the outstanding shares are owned by insiders, a negotiated merger may
be the preferred acquisition tool in order to acquire additional represen-
tations and warranties. However, in the negotiated merger situation
there is a greater chance that the source of the inside information will be
an officer or director of the company (as in Reed) since a rise in stock
price may be anticipated for both parties and not solely for one (the
target). If this is the case and the director leaks the information improp-
erly,14 6 then liability may arise under the classical theory under a tipper/
tippee analysis and traditional corporate remedies (suits against directors
for breach of duty of care and loyalty, etc.) are available. True, tradi-
tional corporate remedies may lack a criminal sanction; however, as
stated earlier in this comment, criminality is too harsh a sanction to
impose based upon a theory as unclear as the misappropriation theory.
Of course, one could conceive of a Chestman-like scenario in
which none of the alternative remedies would be available. For exam-
ple, using the facts of O'Hagan, had Grand Met only entered into a
negotiated merger with Pillsbury and O'Hagan acquired information
regarding this merger from an insider in a way that was not improper,
then O'Hagan would not be liable under any basis other than the misap-
propriation theory. However, given the underlying purpose and spirit of
the William's Act that was designed to address just such dilemmas
(although only explicitly in the context of a tender offer), it seems more
appropriate that Congress should simply amend §14 to include this ana-
145. See id. at 570.
146. Given the high degree of secrecy surrounding transactions of this sort leaks may more
often than not qualify as having been done improperly.
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lytical gap rather than allow an entire new body of jurisprudence to
address it.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC's Division of Enforcement must always remain vigilant
against forces that would seek to exploit secret information at the
expense of shareholders. However, this vigilance does not have to come
in the form of the misappropriation theory. There is a strong argument
that the misappropriation theory fails to address the vast array of prece-
dent that warned against unduly expanding the scope of § 10(b) liability.
Furthermore, the misappropriation theory fails to take into account the
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" requirement.
The United States Supreme Court's only attempt to reconcile its adop-
tion of the theory with this requirement is to engage in a hindsight analy-
sis and create a presumption that all misappropriations will result in the
trading of securities.' 4 7 Such presumptions are quite dangerous, particu-
larly in a criminal context. The SEC is not rendered helpless by a decla-
ration of the misappropriation theory as void given the breadth and
power of § 14(e) which was specifically tailored for these types of trans-
actions as well as the applicability of the tipper/tippee analysis of the
classical theory. The SEC should rely solely on the classical theory of
insider trading when prosecuting most insider trading cases and use
§ 14(e) for those cases which involve the unique set of facts particular to
those arising in the tender offer context.
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147. Post-O'Hagan courts have been more reluctant to stretch insider trading jurisprudence.
See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (holding that proof that an insider traded
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